The head of Djibouti's ports and free zones authority (APZFD), Aboubaker Omar Hadi, said on 8 October 2026 that traffic through the country's ports was holding up and even growing slightly despite the crisis in the Red Sea. Large ships, he said, were unloading their cargo in Djibouti because of the situation at sea. He also said his ports' costs had risen substantially. The state news agency ADI reported his remarks on 9 October.1
What the port authority says
Mr Hadi described the gain as a by-product of a situation Djibouti did not choose.1
« Notre volume de transbordement a augmenté parce que, tout simplement, les gros navires déchargent leurs marchandises dans les ports de Djibouti, la situation étant ce qu'elle est en mer Rouge »
"Our transshipment volume has increased simply because the big ships are unloading their goods in the ports of Djibouti, given the situation in the Red Sea."1
Transshipment means unloading cargo from one ship to load it on to another for a further port. Mr Hadi said the authority had little room to act: "On n'est pas acteurs dans cette crise. On la subit" ("We are not actors in this crisis. We are subject to it"). ADI reports that he blamed higher costs on dearer fuel for handling goods and containers, and said the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz was adding to the ports' operating charges. He gave no traffic or cost figures in the remarks ADI reported.1
Transshipment also features in the ports' own announcements. Doraleh Multipurpose Port said in October that it had handled 2,700 electric vehicles, some unloaded for the Djiboutian market and the rest moved through the terminal to other ports in the region, ADI reported on 11 October.2
What the shipping data show
Djibouti sits at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, beside the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Daily data published by PortWatch, an International Monetary Fund platform that counts ship transits through 28 chokepoints, show how far traffic through the strait remains below its level before the crisis. This site averaged the daily counts by month:3
- October 2023: 78.6 transits a day, of which 19.5 by container ships.3
- October 2025: 36.1 a day, of which 6.8 by container ships.3
- October 2026: 27.9 a day, of which 6.0 by container ships.3
- 1 to 15 November 2026: 26.2 a day, of which 4.8 by container ships.3
On this site's arithmetic, October 2026 transits were about 35% of the October 2023 level, and container-ship transits about 31%. The monthly average fell from 36.6 a day in June 2026 to 27.4 in August. These are counts of ships passing the strait, not of cargo handled in Djibouti, and the data do not show where each ship called.3
Courting Somali ports and new users
The authority is also promoting its role to neighbours. On 3 November, during a visit by the speaker of Somalia's House of the People, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, the APZFD listed its work with Somali ports: two tugboats and container-handling equipment donated to Mogadishu, where a Djiboutian technical team was deployed for two years; surveys and a tug for Bosaso; and studies for a port at Hobyo with a road corridor towards Ethiopia's Somali region. It said eleven Somali companies operate in Djibouti's free zones.4
That list led to a public disagreement with the port authority of Berbera, in Somaliland. ADI reported on 3 November that eleven senior Berbera staff had trained in Djibouti for six months; its 13 November report quotes the APZFD statement as saying "about ten". On 13 November it reported that the Berbera Port Authority, in a statement dated 11 November, had "categorically" rejected the claim and asked for a correction. The APZFD responded by posting a 2014 video showing Mr Hadi with Somaliland port trainees, and Mr Hadi wrote that his authority was proud of the help and would give it again at Berbera's request. This site did not read the Berbera statement itself.4 5
Companies are also being asked to use the free zone. On 15 October the logistics group BMMI urged the APZFD to extend the first phase of the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone, which covers 240 hectares, and Mr Hadi invited BMMI to adopt a model he calls "CIF Djibouti", under which goods are stocked in Djibouti in advance for regional markets.6
Mr Hadi's remarks, as ADI reported them, gave no 2026 transshipment volumes. At a meeting on port cooperation with Saudi Arabia's ambassador on 11 October, the two sides discussed preparations for the eighth session of their joint commission, scheduled for December 2026 in Riyadh.1 7