The United States and China
What each side charges the other today, what else each has done, what the truce suspends, and what neither has given up.
What the United States charges on Chinese goods
There is no single rate. A Chinese product pays the ordinary duty, then whichever of the following layers apply to it. The layers that came from emergency powers were removed by the Supreme Court; the rest remain.1
| Layer | Rate | Legal basis | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ordinary duty (most-favoured-nation) | about 3.3% on average | US tariff schedule | In force |
| 2018–2019 tariffs, Lists 1 to 3 | 25% | Section 301 | In force |
| 2019 tariffs, List 4A | 7.5% | Section 301 | In force; halved from 15% in February 2020 |
| 2024 review increases | 25% to 100% by product: electric vehicles 100%, solar cells 50%, semiconductors 50%, steel and aluminium 25%, batteries, magnets, graphite 25% | Section 301 | In force; last steps took effect 1 January 2026 |
| Forced-labour tariff | 12.5% | Section 301 | In force since 24 July 2026; does not stack on Section 232 goods; some products exempt |
| Steel, aluminium and derivatives | 50% | Section 232 | In force since 4 June 2025 |
| Cars and parts | 25% | Section 232 | In force since April and May 2025 |
| Copper products | 50% | Section 232 | In force since 1 August 2025 |
| “Fentanyl” tariff | was 10% (20% before November 2025) | Emergency powers (IEEPA) | Struck down 20 February 2026 |
| “Reciprocal” tariff | was 10% (125% at its peak in April 2025) | Emergency powers (IEEPA) | Struck down 20 February 2026 |
| Global surcharge | 10% collected | Section 122 | Expired 24 July 2026 |
How it adds up. China Briefing gives two worked examples: a nuclear reactor part pays 25% plus 12.5% plus 3.3%, or 40.8%; an electric bus pays 100% plus 12.5% plus 2%, or 114.5%. It describes the effective rate on many goods as close to 30%. Another tracker, quoted in August 2026, put the average at 35.2% covering 89% of goods; this site did not check that figure against its source.1
The ceiling China claims. After the May 2026 summit in Beijing, both sides spoke of restoring tariffs under Section 301 provided they did not exceed the level agreed at Busan. China reads that as a combined 20%. With 12.5% already imposed, that would leave room for no more than 7.5% from the pending excess-capacity case. China's Commerce Ministry put it on the record on 27 July 2026: the US “clearly promised” that replacement tariffs on Chinese goods would not exceed 20%. Washington has not published the commitment in those terms.1 48 49
What China charges on US goods, and what else it has done
| Measure | Rate or effect | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Reply to the 2018 steel and aluminium tariffs | 15% to 25% on US metals and other goods | In force since April 2018 |
| Reply to the 2018–2019 tariffs | 2.5% to 25% on soybeans, liquefied natural gas, cars, chemicals and more | In force; some halved in February 2020 |
| Reply to the 2025 “reciprocal” tariff | 10% on all US goods; a further 24 points suspended | 10% in force; suspension extended two months from 10 November 202647 9 |
| Tariffs on US farm goods, energy and machinery from early 2025 | 10% to 15% | Cancelled from 10 November 2025 |
| Export licences for seven medium and heavy rare earths | Every shipment needs a licence | In force since April 202534 |
| Wider rare-earth and critical-mineral controls announced October 2025 | Would extend licensing to goods containing small amounts of Chinese material | Suspended; pause extended to 10 January 202710 |
| Unreliable entity list: 11 US firms added April 2025 | Barred from China trade and new investment | Suspended; extended two months from 10 November 20267 |
| Export-control list: 16 US entities | Barred from receiving dual-use goods | Suspended to the same date9 |
| Special port fees on US-linked ships | Charged per voyage | Suspended to the same date9 |
China's leverage is not its tariff. A 10% duty on US goods matters less than control of rare earths, which US car, electronics and defence makers cannot yet source elsewhere at scale. The licensing regime of April 2025 was never lifted; only the wider package of October 2025 is paused. That is why each truce extension lists the rare-earth pause beside the tariff.34 10
Show these figures as a table
| Stage | China's share | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Mining | 60% | about 60% |
| Refining | 91% | |
| Sintered permanent magnets | 94% | up from about 50% in 2005 |
Source: International Energy Agency.44
More on this on the Rare earths page.
What the truce covers
The truce is a set of parallel suspensions, not a treaty. It began at Geneva on 12 May 2025, when both sides cut their peak tariffs to 10% for 90 days. It was extended in August 2025, and widened at Busan on 30 October 2025, when Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met: the US halved the fentanyl tariff, China paused its new rare-earth controls and dropped tariffs on US farm goods, and both set 10 November 2026 as the end date.1
Three leader meetings followed in 2026. In Beijing in May the two sides agreed on a framework and on bodies to manage trade. In Washington in late September they launched a Board of Trade and a Board of Investment, and the White House announced recommendations for tariff cuts on $30 billion of non-sensitive goods in each direction. Reviewers described the Washington summit as thin on substance, with no progress on rare earths or semiconductors. The extension to 10 January 2027 dates from around that meeting. A trade council under the consultation mechanism held its first meeting, by video, on 13 November 2026; the Chinese account calls the exchange “candid, in-depth and constructive” and lists tariffs, the “$30 billion for $30 billion” matching cuts and farm trade as the subjects.15 13 14 92
Farm purchases are disputed. The White House says China agreed to buy at least 25 million tonnes of US soybeans in each of 2026, 2027 and 2028, and Chinese press reports of the May 2026 arrangement repeat that figure with a further $17 billion a year of other farm goods. Beijing has not itself published the numbers. Analysts point to a gap of about 10 million tonnes between the pledge and the US Department of Agriculture's own balance sheet, and note that state firms are doing the buying while private crushers stay with Brazil. By mid-October a Reuters count put 2026 purchases at about 13.7 million tonnes.30 31 90 89
The truce, deadline by deadline
| Agreed | Where | What was suspended or cut | Ran until |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12 May 2025 | Geneva | Both sides cut the new tariffs from 125% to 10% | 90 days, to mid-August 2025 |
| 11 August 2025 | by announcement | The same, extended | 10 November 2025 |
| 30 October 2025 | Busan, Trump–Xi meeting | US fentanyl tariff halved; China paused its October rare-earth package and dropped farm tariffs | 10 November 2026 |
| September to 9 November 2026 | Washington summit, then Chinese notices | China's 24-point tariff, rare-earth package, firm lists and port fees stay suspended; US ship fees and exclusions likewise | 10 January 2027 |
Each extension has been shorter than the last: ninety days, ninety days, a year, then two months. China's notice of 9 November says it will adjust its countermeasures as circumstances require.1 13 47
What is still unresolved
- The level of US tariffs. Whether the excess-capacity case adds to the 12.5%, and whether any addition breaches what China says was promised.1 28
- Rare earths. China's licensing remains; the US wants general licences or guaranteed supply.34
- Technology controls. US export controls on advanced chips and China's replies sit outside the truce texts and were not settled at either 2026 summit.14
- The $30 billion of tariff cuts. They are recommendations, discussed at the trade council on 13 November and not finalised.13 92