Russia, China, BRICS and Africa
Russia-China trade is large and growing again, but the figures read for this page do not show that it, or BRICS membership, has raised growth in African countries.
Assessment dated 17 November 2026
Trade in goods between Russia and China was $228.1 billion in 2025 and rose 30.6% in the first nine months of 2026, on Chinese customs figures.1 This page sets that beside China's trade with Africa, Russia's trade with Africa, what BRICS gives its African members and how those members' economies have grown. Where no source could be opened, the page says so.
How much Russia-China trade has grown
China's General Administration of Customs counted $190 billion of two-way goods trade with Russia in 2022, a rise of 29.3% on 2021. It reached $240.11 billion in 2023 and a record $244.81 billion in 2024.2 In 2025 it fell 6.9% to $228.1 billion, the first annual fall in this run of figures.1
Show these figures as a table
| Item | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $190.0 billion | up 29.3%; TASS gives the rounded figure |
| 2023 | $240.1 billion | up 26.3% |
| 2024 | $244.8 billion | up 1.9%, record |
| 2025 | $228.1 billion | down 6.9% |
The fall did not last. In January to September 2026, a part-year figure, trade was $214.3 billion, 30.6% more than in the same months of 2025. Chinese exports to Russia were $98.06 billion, up 33.1%, and Chinese imports from Russia $116.24 billion, up 28.6%. Russia's surplus was $18.16 billion.1 Earlier readings in 2026 show the same direction: $134.2 billion in the first half, up 25.6%, and $159.24 billion in the first seven months, up 26.3%.4 5
Nine months of 2026 already equal 94% of the whole of 2025; that share is this page's arithmetic. Annual figures for 2019 to 2021 and a January to October 2026 figure could not be opened and are left out.1
What moves. Izvestia, citing the customs data, says Russian sales to China are mainly oil, natural gas and coal, with copper, timber, seafood and farm products. China sends cars, tractors, computers, smartphones, industrial equipment and consumer goods.3 Russia's finance minister, Anton Siluanov, has said 99.1% of payments between the two countries are made in roubles and yuan.5
How that trade can reach African economies
There are four ways the Russia-China shift could touch Africa. The evidence found for each is uneven, and for two of them it is thin.
1. Russian oil and coal competing with African exporters in China. Russia was China's largest crude oil supplier in 2025, according to a Columbia University analysis of Chinese customs data. China imported 11.6 million barrels a day in 2025, up from 11.1 million. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Iraq and Brazil together supplied 62%. Russian deliveries fell by 150,000 barrels a day, or 6.9%, in 2025, and the growth went almost entirely to Brazil and Indonesia.6 The text of that analysis gives no share for Angola or Nigeria, so this page cannot say how much African crude Russian oil displaced. No source was opened on South African or Mozambican coal sales to China, or on liquefied natural gas.
2. Russian grain and fertiliser sold to Africa. This channel is documented. A Kremlin aide, Yury Ushakov, said Russia shipped more than 18 million tonnes of grain to Africa in 2025 and 13 million tonnes in the first nine months of 2026.8 Russia's foreign ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, said fertiliser deliveries to Africa grew from 1.5 million tonnes last year to more than 2.2 million tonnes this year.9 In October 2026 Russia was again Egypt's largest wheat supplier, with 403,245 tonnes of the 985,425 tonnes Egypt imported, according to shipping data reported by S&P Global.7 That is about 41%, by this page's arithmetic. These are Russian official statements and one month of shipping data, not customs totals.
3. China's own trade with Africa. This is by far the largest of the flows. Chinese customs put trade with the 53 African states that have diplomatic ties with China at $348.08 billion in 2025, a record.11 A China Daily article gives $295.6 billion for 2024, which makes the 2025 rise 17.7%, with Chinese exports to Africa up 25.8% from $178.76 billion to $225.03 billion.10
Show these figures as a table
| Item | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | $295.6 billion | |
| 2025 | $348.1 billion | record; up 17.7% |
| Jan-Oct 2026 | $346.8 billion | part-year |
The balance runs against Africa and is widening. Africa's deficit with China was $102.01 billion in 2025, 64.5% wider than in 2024. In the first ten months of 2026 it was $101.4 billion: China sold Africa $224.14 billion of goods, up 24%, and bought $122.72 billion, up 20.3%.12 The ten-month figures come from a news report of the customs release of 9 November, not from the customs tables themselves.
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| Item | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $102.0 billion | full year |
| Jan-Oct 2026 | $101.4 billion | part-year |
Sources: 12
4. Russia's direct trade with Africa. It is small. Mr Ushakov said it was above $27 billion in 2025, one and a half times the 2023 level.8 Ms Zakharova named Egypt and Algeria as Russia's largest African partners.9 No breakdown by country or product was found.
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| Item | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| China-Africa | $348 billion | 53 African states |
| Russia-China | $228 billion | |
| Russia-Africa | $27 billion | given as 'above $27 billion' |
On these figures Russia-Africa trade is about 8% of China-Africa trade and about 12% of Russia-China trade; both ratios are this page's arithmetic.11 1 8
Which African countries are in BRICS, and what it provides
BRICS has eleven members. Three are African: South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia. Two African states, Nigeria and Uganda, are among its ten partner countries, a category created at the Kazan summit in October 2024.13 14 Algeria is not on the list of partners published by India, which chairs BRICS in 2026.13
| Country | Status | Since | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | Member | Inclusion agreed in 2010; attended its first summit in 2011 | 13 |
| Egypt | Member | January 2024 | 13 |
| Ethiopia | Member | January 2024 | 13 |
| Nigeria | Partner country | Admission announced 17 January 2025 | 14 |
| Uganda | Partner country | 2025 | 13 |
| Ghana | Says it intends to apply as a partner country | Stated October 2026; not admitted | 18 |
BRICS is not a trade agreement. India's chairmanship site describes it as "a useful platform for consultation and cooperation" on global and regional issues and on political and economic governance.13 None of the official pages read for this page sets out a tariff preference, a common external tariff or a free-trade area among members. Whatever tariffs African members pay in China, Russia or India come from those countries' own schedules and from separate measures, such as China's zero-tariff treatment described below.11
The New Development Bank is the main BRICS institution that lends. South Africa is a founding member, from 3 July 2015. Egypt joined on 20 February 2023 and Algeria on 19 May 2025. Ethiopia, Angola and Zimbabwe are listed as prospective members: admitted by the board of governors but not yet members until they deposit their instruments of accession.15 In September 2026 South Africa signed a $1 billion loan from the bank for municipal infrastructure, with a 16-year maturity.16 A total for the bank's approvals in Africa was not found on the pages opened.
Local currencies. At the New Delhi summit in September 2026 BRICS encouraged the bank to expand lending in local currencies and stopped short of backing a common currency, Business Standard reported.17 That is a stated aim. The only volume found is for Russia and China, not for Africa: the 99.1% share of payments in roubles and yuan cited by Russia's finance minister.5
Have Africa's BRICS members grown faster?
World Bank figures for real GDP growth give three different answers for three members. In 2025 Ethiopia grew 9.8%, Egypt 4.4% and South Africa 1.1%. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole grew 4.1%.20
Show these figures as a table
| Item | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Ethiopia | 9.8% | member since 2024 |
| Egypt | 4.4% | member since 2024 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 4.1% | regional aggregate |
| South Africa | 1.1% | in BRICS since 2010-11 |
Sources: 20
| Economy | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 0.3% | -6.2% | 4.9% | 2.1% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 1.1% |
| Egypt | 5.6% | 3.5% | 3.3% | 6.6% | 3.8% | 2.4% | 4.4% |
| Ethiopia | 8.4% | 6.1% | 5.6% | 5.3% | 6.6% | 7.6% | 9.8% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 2.5% | -3.3% | 3.6% | 4.0% | 2.7% | 3.6% | 4.1% |
Sources: 20
- South Africa, the longest-standing African member, grew more slowly than Sub-Saharan Africa in six of the seven years; 2021 is the exception.20
- Egypt grew 2.4% in 2024, its first year as a member, and 4.4% in 2025. Both are below its 5.6% of 2019 and 6.6% of 2022.20
- Ethiopia grew 7.6% in 2024 and 9.8% in 2025, faster than in 2020 to 2023. It was already growing at 8.4% in 2019, before it joined.20
These figures cannot show cause. There are three countries, two of them with two years of membership, and each has its own story. The World Bank says reforms in South Africa have substantially reduced electricity shortages.21 It says Egypt has made progress towards macroeconomic stabilisation while the conflict in the Middle East raises risks through capital outflows, oil import costs, tourism and remittances.22 It says Ethiopia defaulted on debt in 2023 and began a reform in July 2024, including a market-determined exchange rate, supported by IMF and World Bank financing and G-20 debt relief.23 None of these World Bank pages names BRICS as a driver of growth.
Figures for each member's exports to China or to other BRICS states could not be obtained for this page, so it cannot say whether membership was followed by more trade with the group.
Where the trade war comes in
The United States charges South Africa and Egypt an extra 12.5%. Both are among the economies named in the Section 301 action on forced-labour import bans. The additional duty applies to goods entered on or after 24 July 2026.24 The Trade Representative set 10% for economies that have such a ban, have committed to one or have a partial regime, and 12.5% "for all other investigated economies".25 The word Ethiopia does not appear in the notice.24
US goods imports were $16.5 billion from South Africa and $2.8 billion from Egypt in 2025.28 29
South Africa is due to lose AGOA preferences. On 2 November 2026 the Trade Representative said President Trump had notified Congress of his intent to end South Africa's place in the African Growth and Opportunity Act programme as of 1 January 2027.26 That has not yet taken effect. The economist Wandile Sihlobo told the Daily Maverick that some South African products now paying 12.5% would pay 15.9% without the programme.27
China has moved the other way. From 1 May 2026 to 30 April 2028 it applies a zero tariff to 20 African countries that have diplomatic ties with it and are not least developed countries; for goods under tariff quotas only the in-quota rate falls to zero. The 33 least developed African countries with ties have had zero tariffs on all lines since 1 December 2024. The first shipment under the new measure was South African apples, whose tariff fell from 10% to zero.11 This is a Chinese measure for African states in general, not a BRICS benefit: it covers 53 countries, most of which are not in BRICS.11 13
So far the zero tariff has gone with more trade in both directions and a wider gap. In the ten months to October 2026 China's purchases from Africa rose 20.3% and its sales to Africa rose 24%.12
What the evidence supports
Russia-China trade has grown a great deal, with one interruption. It rose from $190 billion in 2022 to a record $244.81 billion in 2024, fell 6.9% in 2025 and is up 30.6% in the first nine months of 2026.2 1
Its effect on Africa cannot be measured from the figures found. The plausible harm is competition: Russia is China's largest crude supplier, in a market where African producers also sell.6 The plausible gain is supply: Russian grain and fertiliser reach Africa in quantity.8 9 7 No source read here puts a number on either effect for any African country. What the figures do show is scale: Russia's trade with Africa is about 8% of China's.11 8
The data does not show that BRICS brings growth to African members. BRICS sets no tariffs.13 South Africa, a member for fifteen years, has grown more slowly than its region in six of the last seven years. Ethiopia has grown fast, but it did so before it joined. Egypt's growth in its two years of membership is below its earlier peaks.20 Some commentators say membership leads to more trade; a South African academic told EWN in 2025 that it does so "automatically".30 A Ghanaian economist said in October 2026 that joining "does not transform your economy overnight, or even over a 15-year period".19 The figures on this page are closer to the second view, but they prove neither.
What members do get is access to a lender and a seat. South Africa's $1 billion New Development Bank loan is a concrete case.16 The largest recent change in African market access, China's zero tariff, went to members and non-members alike.11
To know more would take each member's exports to BRICS states by year from customs data, the bank's lending to Africa as a total, China's crude and coal imports by supplier, and several more years of growth figures set against comparable non-members.
How to read this page
- All figures were taken from sources opened on 17 November 2026; each is cited where it appears.
- Russia-China and China-Africa trade figures are China's General Administration of Customs data in US dollars, as reported by news agencies and newspapers, not read from the customs tables. Partner-country data (Russia's or African states' own customs) record the same trade differently and would not match.1 11
- The Russia-Africa figure is a statement by a Kremlin official with no published table behind it in the sources read, so its basis is not known and it is not strictly comparable with the Chinese customs figures.8
- The January to October 2026 China-Africa figures come from one secondary news report of the customs release.12 The 2024 China-Africa figures come from an opinion article in China Daily.10
- Left out because no source could be opened: Russia-China annual totals for 2019 to 2021 and January to October 2026; China's crude import shares for Angola and Nigeria; coal and liquefied natural gas flows; China-Africa trade before 2024; Russia-Africa trade by country; African members' exports to China and other BRICS states; total New Development Bank approvals in Africa; IMF country reports.
- GDP growth is the World Bank series NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, last updated 11 November 2026, fetched for South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sub-Saharan Africa aggregate (SSF) in separate calls. Egypt is in North Africa and is not part of that aggregate. Values are rounded to one decimal place.20
- Ratios and shares marked as this page's arithmetic were calculated from the cited rounded figures.
- Part-year figures for 2026 are labelled and should not be read against full years.
- A country growing faster or slower after joining BRICS does not show that BRICS was the reason. Three countries and a few years are too few to separate membership from commodity prices, wars, debt and domestic policy.
- Scheduled events, including South Africa's removal from AGOA on 1 January 2027, are reported as scheduled, not as done.
- This page is information, not investment, trade or legal advice.
Sources for this page
- Trade between Russia and China up by 30.6% to $214.3 bln in January-September
TASS · 14 October 2026 - China-Russia trade rises 1.9% to $244.81 bln last year
TASS · 13 January 2025 - Trade turnover between Russia and China increased by more than 30% in 2026
Izvestia · 14 October 2026 - Russia-China trade grows 25.6% in first half of 2026
The Moscow Times · 14 July 2026 - Russia-China Trade Hits $159B Record as Dollar Exits Bilateral Payments
Tech Times · 7 August 2026 - Where China Gets Its Oil: Crude Imports in 2025 Reveal Stockpiling and Changing Fortunes of Certain Suppliers, Including Those Sanctioned
Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University · Accessed 17 November 2026 - Egypt's October wheat imports nearly triple, corn imports fall 35%
Hellenic Shipping News, carrying S&P Global · 8 November 2026 - Trade turnover between Russia, African countries above $27 bln in 2025 — Kremlin aide
TASS · 26 October 2026 - Nigeria, S'Africa drive Russia-Africa $27bn trade boom
Vanguard (Nigeria) · 27 October 2026 - Zero-tariff policy fuels African trade (opinion, Teshome Toga Chanaka)
China Daily · 9 October 2026 - 对53国全面实施零关税举措生效 首票非洲好物抢“鲜”入境 (Zero-tariff measure for 53 countries takes effect; first African goods clear customs)
Xinhua · 1 May 2026 - Africa's trade deficit with China surpasses $100 billion in 2026 despite record bilateral trade growth
fundsforNGOs News · 16 November 2026 - About BRICS: members and partner countries
Government of India, BRICS 2026 chairmanship site · Accessed 17 November 2026 - Nigeria joins BRICS as a partner country
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil · 17 January 2025 - Members
New Development Bank · Accessed 17 November 2026 - South Africa agrees $1bln infrastructure loan with New Development Bank
Zawya, carrying Reuters · September 2026 - New Development Bank: How Brics bank raises money and finances projects
Business Standard · 16 September 2026 - Ghana not seeking full BRICS membership, applying as Partner Country – Ablakwa
MyJoyOnline (Ghana) · 10 October 2026 - BRICS membership won't transform Ghana's economy without domestic reforms – Bokpin
MyJoyOnline (Ghana) · 8 October 2026 - GDP growth (annual %), NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG: South Africa; the same call was made with EGY, ETH and SSF in place of ZAF (API, last updated 11 November 2026)
World Bank, World Development Indicators · 11 November 2026 - South Africa: overview
World Bank · Accessed 17 November 2026 - Egypt: overview
World Bank · Accessed 17 November 2026 - Ethiopia: overview
World Bank · Accessed 17 November 2026 - Notice of Actions in Section 301 Investigations Related to the Failure of Each Economy To Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced With Forced Labor
Federal Register (US Government Publishing Office) · 28 July 2026 - USTR Takes Action in Forced Labor Section 301 Investigations
Office of the US Trade Representative · 23 July 2026 - Ambassador Greer Issues Statement on President Trump's Intent to Terminate Rwanda and South Africa from the AGOA Trade Preference Program
Office of the US Trade Representative · 2 November 2026 - SA loses Agoa access: what the US trade fallout means
Daily Maverick · 3 November 2026 - South Africa: trade summary
Office of the US Trade Representative · Accessed 17 November 2026 - Egypt: trade summary
Office of the US Trade Representative · Accessed 17 November 2026 - Nigeria joins BRICS as 'partner country'
EWN (Eyewitness News, South Africa) · 22 January 2025