Trade War

Analysis

Which countries are most exposed to tariffs, sanctions and other trade restrictions, and where the damage is likely to fall.

Assessment dated 17 November 2026 · Outlook: next 6–12 months, assuming existing measures continue

Russia and Iran face broad restrictions on entire transactions. Canada, Mexico, Vietnam and Cambodia stand out for dependence on US market access. China faces overlapping trade and technology constraints, while US importers and consumers bear substantial domestic costs. The ordering changes with the question: national vulnerability, total dollars at stake, or pressure on particular industries.

Broad sanctions pressureRussia and Iran: restrictions reach finance, energy and shipping. Belarus and North Korea also face deep constraints, with different scope and histories.
High dependence on US accessCanada, Mexico, Vietnam and Cambodia: concentrated trade ties magnify disruption, although exemptions and alternative sourcing create important buffers.
Large and concentrated costsChina and the US face broad exposure; Brazil, Bangladesh and major industrial exporters face sharper sectoral effects than national averages reveal.

Sanctions constrain entire transactions

These economies face barriers to settlement, financing, shipping or market access. Their exposure is broader than a tariff surcharge, but scope differs across sanctioning jurisdictions.

Russia

Very high · payments, energy and logistics

Policy. The EU’s 16 November package added 101 entities and 12 people, including nearly 50 Russian financial institutions and businesses connected to oil and shipping.

Expected impact. Additional screening and restricted counterparties make payment and delivery harder, putting pressure on export receipts and financing.16

Buffers and limits. Alternative buyers can preserve trade, but do not remove restrictions on designated banks, vessels or intermediaries. War effects cannot be separated from sanctions using these sources.

Iran

Very high · energy and financial access

Policy. EU nuclear-related economic restrictions include energy import bans and financial measures. US August action widened secondary-sanctions exposure alongside new designations.

Expected impact. Energy sellers and businesses reliant on international finance face fewer usable customers, payment channels and service providers.17 18

Buffers and limits. Secondary-sanctions exposure is conditional; it does not mean every foreign customer is already sanctioned. Conflict and oil prices also shape outcomes.

Belarus

High · potash, industry and transport

Policy. EU restrictions cover potash, wood, cement, iron, steel and rubber, alongside financial and transport measures.

Expected impact. Affected exporters face reduced market access and greater routing and transaction costs. Concentrated commodity industries are especially exposed.19 20

Buffers and limits. US general-licence relief and removals in March 2026 partly ease US restrictions. They do not repeal EU measures.

North Korea

Extreme existing isolation · limited comparability

Policy. UN measures restrict coal, minerals, seafood and textile exports, petroleum supplies, trade finance and joint ventures.

Expected impact. Constraints reach both foreign-exchange earnings and imported inputs, creating persistent structural exposure.21

Buffers and limits. This is a long-established sanctions regime, not a comparable new 2026 tariff shock. Sparse data prevent a credible numerical comparison.

US dependence magnifies tariff exposure

Destination dependence, product coverage and local value added matter more than the headline rate. Canada and Mexico retain substantial preferential protection; smaller exporters can face concentrated employment effects.

Canada

High · targeted industries and US dependence

Policy. Selected goods face 50% Section 338 duties even when CUSMA-compliant; the product list changed again on 30 October. Metals and vehicles have separate sector rules.

Expected impact. Machinery, furniture, plastics and wood-related producers face a severe access shock where covered, discouraging orders and investment.3 4

Buffers and limits. The Bank of Canada estimated about 80% of US-bound goods remained tariff-free in its October outlook. Energy, potash and critical minerals buffer the aggregate.

Mexico

High · autos, metals and integrated production

Policy. USMCA qualification shields much trade, while sector-specific vehicle and metals duties leave exposed industries under pressure.

Expected impact. Cross-border production makes origin compliance and parts costs consequential. Fed evidence finds weaker exports in more tariff-exposed sectors despite rising overall exports.5

Buffers and limits. A computer/server export surge supported the total. Much assembly uses imported components, so gross export growth overstates domestic gains; the study’s outcome data largely end in spring 2026.

Vietnam

High · US demand and supplier competition

Policy. The general July Section 301 tier is 12.5%, subject to exemptions. The US was Vietnam’s largest export destination in the first half of 2026.

Expected impact. Export factories face margin and order pressure when buyers compare suppliers; reliance on imported inputs limits the domestic income retained from each shipment.1 6 7

Buffers and limits. Relocated production has supported exports. Fed research finds real investment and production shifts, so increased trade should not automatically be labelled transshipment.

Cambodia

High structural exposure · small export economy

Policy. The current general Section 301 tier is 10%, with exemptions. An older ADB study put US-bound exports at 25% of GDP but only 6% of domestic value added.

Expected impact. A concentrated export base makes changes in US orders important for factories and jobs, even when its global trade footprint is small.1 8

Buffers and limits. Those ADB figures are a historical baseline. Its older 19% tariff scenario did not imply a large aggregate loss; exposure is not a current GDP-loss forecast.

Bangladesh

High sector concentration · garments

Policy. The July action adds 10% on covered goods. Ordinary apparel duties remain relevant; UN analysis puts nearly 90% of US-bound shipments in apparel and garments.

Expected impact. Concentration channels pressure into garment orders, margins and employment, with fewer immediate product alternatives.1 9

Buffers and limits. Its general surcharge is below China’s and Vietnam’s, creating a relative advantage. The concentration evidence predates July; earlier reciprocal tariff rates are superseded.

Brazil

Severe for selected manufacturers

Policy. Two Section 301 actions combine to add 37.5% on goods representing 16.5% of 2024 exports to the US, including machinery, footwear, furniture and clothing.

Expected impact. Covered producers face substantial price disadvantages even if national export totals remain resilient.10

Buffers and limits. MDIC estimates 52.7% of the same US-bound basket faces neither Section 301 nor Section 232 surcharges. These shares concern the US market, not all Brazilian exports.

Technology and input costs spread the effects

Large economies can face substantial dollar costs without suffering the largest proportional national loss. Technology controls, mineral licensing and duties affect different industries through different channels.

China

High combined exposure · manufacturing and technology

Policy. The July tariff action coexists with older product-specific duties and advanced-chip access controls. Low-value parcel treatment also remains restricted.

Expected impact. Exporters face multiple access barriers, while technology restrictions constrain selected advanced-computing uses. Direct-to-consumer sellers face duty and administrative costs.1 12 22 26 7

Buffers and limits. Production relocation offers a partial buffer. The US extended 178 product exclusions until January 2027; this is targeted relief, not a general tariff repeal.

United States

Broad domestic burden · consumers and downstream firms

Policy. US import duties raise landed costs; retaliatory measures also affect exporters.

Expected impact. New York Fed research estimates around 90% pass-through into import prices. Consumer-goods prices adjust over time, including through more expensive US-made goods and imported inputs.11 3

Buffers and limits. Protected producers can benefit, but those gains do not establish a net national benefit. The research describes price transmission, not an explanation of all inflation.

Germany

High sector exposure · autos and machinery

Policy. US sector duties and China’s existing rare-earth licensing affect manufacturing access and supply chains.

Expected impact. Export margins and delivery reliability remain vulnerable. Official data show weaker car exports in January–July, but that decline alone does not prove tariff causality.2 13 23 24

Buffers and limits. Product demand, alternative markets and firm sourcing decisions can cushion the effect. No comparable tariff-only GDP loss was verified.

Japan

High sector exposure · vehicles and equipment

Policy. Sector-specific duties coexist with preferential general tariff treatment. Magnet-using industries remain exposed to Chinese mineral licensing.

Expected impact. Trade costs and potential input delays pressure production margins and investment decisions.1 2 14 23 24

Buffers and limits. The Bank of Japan’s October outlook reports support from hybrid demand, new car models and AI-related equipment orders. Those demand offsets prevent a simple tariff-to-export-loss mapping.

South Korea

High sector exposure · autos, metals and chips

Policy. Autos and metals face tariff pressure. Equipment for certain foreign-owned fabs in China requires licences following removal of licence-free privileges.

Expected impact. Manufacturers face higher trade costs and constraints on some technology upgrades or capacity expansion.15 25

Buffers and limits. The OECD identifies resilient chip demand and shifting value chains as offsets. A licensing requirement is not evidence that Korean-owned factories in China have shut down.

Carbon rules and preference changes create new pressure

These cases illustrate risks missed by US tariff rankings. Current CBAM obligations are distinct from future settlement deadlines, while announced preference and chip-rule changes remain prospective at this assessment date.

Mozambique

High modelled CBAM exposure · aluminium

Policy. The EU’s definitive carbon-border regime covers selected aluminium imports from 2026. A World Bank screening model highlights Mozambique’s concentrated exposure.

Expected impact. Carbon accounting and covered embedded emissions can affect competitiveness and buyer demand in a small export base.27 28

Buffers and limits. The model uses older trade and emissions data, not measured 2026 costs. Verified plant emissions and cleaner production can reduce the burden.

Ukraine

High modelled CBAM exposure · covered industry

Policy. Ukraine also ranks highly in the World Bank’s historical economic-exposure screen for EU carbon-border measures.

Expected impact. Covered exporters face emissions-data and adjustment requirements alongside their other operating pressures.27 28

Buffers and limits. The screen is not a GDP-loss estimate. War damage and changing production make older trade and emissions patterns especially uncertain.

Egypt

Material modelled CBAM exposure

Policy. Egypt is another prominent case in the World Bank’s GDP-relative CBAM exposure screen; the mechanism applies to covered products, not every export.

Expected impact. Carbon-intensive shipments can become less competitive, with compliance demands affecting producers and EU buyers.27 28 29

Buffers and limits. Actual costs depend on product mix, emissions and deductible carbon prices already paid abroad. First surrender for 2026 imports is due on 30 September 2027.

South Africa and Rwanda

Scheduled preference risk · 1 January 2027

Policy. USTR announced intent to end AGOA eligibility from 1 January 2027. The withdrawal is not yet in force on 17 November.

Expected impact. Producers currently using the affected preferences face potential duty increases and order uncertainty as buyers plan 2027 sourcing.30

Buffers and limits. Exposure depends on actual product eligibility and preference use. It is incorrect to treat all exports as currently duty-free or already affected by withdrawal.

Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil

Scheduled licensing risk · advanced computing

Policy. A new BIS rule is scheduled for publication on 19 November and becomes effective on publication, covering specified advanced-computing shipments and remote access.

Expected impact. Additional licences could delay some data-centre deliveries and investment; remote-access rules also constrain specified end users.22

Buffers and limits. This is not yet effective at the cutoff. Applications are reviewed case by case, exceptions apply, and the rule is not a ban on all electronics or trade.

What could change the assessment

Product relief can change the order

USMCA eligibility, revised Canadian product lists and China exclusions can materially alter exposure without changing the headline country rate. Preferential treatment must be checked against the specific duty and product.4 12 5

A pause still leaves licensing in place

China’s November decision pauses six later export-control announcements through 10 January 2027. The April 2025 rare-earth licensing baseline remains, so a truce reduces escalation risk without guaranteeing unrestricted supply.23 24

Three upcoming implementation points

Recheck the BIS rule after its scheduled 19 November publication, AGOA implementation ahead of 1 January, and CBAM reporting and settlement requirements for 2026 imports. These events could change sector exposure over the outlook period.22 30 29

How to read this assessment

  • This is a qualitative assessment of selected economies, not an exhaustive global ranking or an official forecast. High exposure describes policy breadth, market dependence, sector concentration and limited short-term alternatives; it is not a calculated score.
  • National vulnerability, absolute dollars and sector-specific pressure are different comparisons. Gross exports include imported inputs and cannot be treated as domestic value added or multiplied by a tariff to estimate GDP losses.
  • Expected impacts are analytical inferences from the cited policies and evidence. Observed trade changes also reflect demand, exchange rates, commodity prices, AI investment and conflict; they do not isolate policy effects.
  • The cutoff is 17 November 2026. Source and data dates are shown below. Existing, paused and scheduled measures are distinguished; exemptions, licences, rules of origin and product classification can change applicability.
  • Do not mechanically stack tariff headlines: the July forced-labour Section 301 action excludes articles subject to Section 232. Sanctions and export controls can prevent transactions altogether and cannot be converted into a comparable tariff percentage.

Sources for this analysis

  1. Final action in the forced-labour Section 301 investigations
    Office of the US Trade Representative · 23 July 2026
  2. Section 301 action: scope and product exemptions
    Office of the US Trade Representative · July 2026
  3. Tariff assumptions in the October Monetary Policy Report
    Bank of Canada · 28 October 2026; policy cutoff 22 October
  4. Resources for Canadian exporters facing US tariffs
    Canadian Trade Commissioner Service · Includes changes effective 30 October 2026
  5. A common pattern behind diverging fortunes: US tariffs and exports from Canada and Mexico
    Federal Reserve Board · 9 November 2026; outcomes mainly through April–May
  6. Socio-economic performance in the first half of 2026
    National Statistics Office of Vietnam · August 2026; first-half data
  7. Vietnam’s export boom to the US: the role of Chinese firms
    Federal Reserve Board · 17 July 2026
  8. Cambodia and the United States tariff: modelling the economic impacts
    Asian Development Bank · October 2025; historical model, not current forecast
  9. Bangladesh graduation readiness assessment
    United Nations · 2026; concentration evidence predates July tariff action
  10. Scope of US tariff measures on Brazilian exports
    Brazil Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services · 24 July 2026; updated 26 October; 2024 trade weights
  11. How fast do tariffs pass through into consumer prices?
    Federal Reserve Bank of New York · 6 October 2026
  12. Extension of 178 exclusions from China Section 301 tariffs
    US Federal Register · 10 November 2026
  13. Exports of new passenger cars in January–July 2026
    Destatis · 21 September 2026; official search extract verified
  14. Outlook for economic activity and prices
    Bank of Japan · October 2026
  15. Korea economic survey: macroeconomic policies and trade exposure
    OECD · 2026 survey; conditions at publication
  16. EU lists 113 individuals and entities linked to Russia’s war financing
    Council of the European Union · 16 November 2026
  17. EU sanctions against Iran
    Council of the European Union · Overview reviewed 16 October 2026
  18. Iran designations and expanded secondary-sanctions exposure
    US Treasury · 24 August 2026
  19. EU sanctions against Belarus
    Council of the European Union · Current overview checked 17 November 2026
  20. Belarus General License 14, directive rescission and removals
    US Treasury / OFAC · 26 March 2026
  21. 1718 Committee: sanctions on North Korea
    United Nations Security Council · Current regime checked 17 November 2026
  22. Advanced computing and remote-access licensing rule
    Bureau of Industry and Security / Federal Register · Public inspection; publication scheduled 19 November 2026
  23. Announcement 18: export controls on specified medium and heavy rare earths
    China Ministry of Commerce · April 2025; existing licensing baseline
  24. Announcement 58: extension of suspension of later export-control measures
    China Ministry of Commerce · 9 November 2026
  25. Licensing requirements for foreign-owned semiconductor fabs in China
    Bureau of Industry and Security · 29 August 2025; authorization framework
  26. International mail: de minimis suspension and informal entries
    US Customs and Border Protection · 8 July 2026; process effective 24 July
  27. CBAM definitive regime
    European Commission · Applies from 1 January 2026
  28. How developing countries can measure exposure to the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism
    World Bank · Historical screening model: 2017 emissions, 2022 trade
  29. CBAM implementation and communication
    European Commission · 2026 implementation guidance; first surrender in 2027
  30. Intent to terminate Rwanda and South Africa AGOA eligibility
    Office of the US Trade Representative · 2 November 2026; intended effective date 1 January 2027