About 90% of Australia's exports, and 83% of its seaborne imports, travel on routes through and around Indonesia, according to an analysis published by Australia's Lowy Institute on 14 April 2026. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has made that dependence a live question in Canberra. Indonesia's government, for its part, said twice this year that it treats passage through its straits as a right under the law of the sea.1 2 3
What travels north
The cargoes on those lanes are mostly bound for North Asia. Australian Bureau of Statistics figures for January to September 2026 put merchandise exports to China at A$144.9 billion, up 12.4% from a year earlier, to Japan at A$44.4 billion, down 2.2%, to South Korea at A$31.7 billion, up 11.2%, and to Taiwan at A$12.7 billion.4
Together the four took about 58% of Australia's A$405.6 billion of merchandise exports in the nine months, by this site's arithmetic on the bureau's table. The figures cover all goods and all routes, gold and air freight included, so they show where trade goes rather than which strait each ship uses.4
The Lowy analysis, by Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, an Indonesian international-law lecturer at Universitas Indonesia, names parts of the Strait of Malacca and the Lombok and Sunda straits among the passages that carry most of Australia's trade.1
What Jakarta said in 2026
The first test came in April, after reports that Indonesia's finance minister, Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, had suggested charging ships to pass through the Strait of Malacca. The foreign minister, Sugiono, ruled the idea out on 23 April, Metro TV News reported, and on 24 April Purbaya told reporters the remark had not been meant seriously and that no levy had ever been planned.3 6
Sebagai negara kepulauan, kita harus menghormati UNCLOS.
As an archipelagic state, we must respect UNCLOS.3
UNCLOS is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. It recognises Indonesia as an archipelagic state, with sovereignty over the waters between its islands, on condition that foreign ships keep the right to pass. Sugiono said that recognition holds only as long as Indonesia charges no tolls in those waters.1 3
The second test came in May, when two Iranian-flagged crude tankers, the Huge and the Derya, reportedly sailed through the Lombok Strait east of Bali towards the Riau Islands. The Maritime Executive, citing tanker trackers, reported that they had avoided the more closely watched Strait of Malacca and, apparently, the US blockade of Iranian oil. Indonesia's foreign ministry declined to act against them:5 2
Pemerintah memandang bahwa kapal-kapal tersebut melaksanakan hak lintasnya sesuai hukum internasional.
The government considers that these vessels are exercising their right of passage in accordance with international law.2
The ministry spokesperson, Yvonne Mewengkang, said Jakarta would keep watching the situation and raise it through diplomatic channels, CNBC Indonesia reported.2
Where the law is contested
Darmawan's analysis argues that law alone does not settle the matter for Australia. Indonesia has closed or restricted its straits before: in 1964 it refused a British aircraft carrier passage through the Sunda Strait, and in 1988 it closed the Sunda and Lombok straits for military exercises, which Canberra said broke international law.1
Indonesia has formally designated only some of its archipelagic sea lanes; the east-west lanes through the Java Sea are not designated. Darmawan cites a senior Indonesian navy officer as reading Article 53(7) of UNCLOS as allowing Jakarta to substitute other lanes when circumstances require, while some legal experts hold that straits normally used for international navigation must stay open.1
"If Indonesia were to close those lanes for any reason, the flow-on effects for Australia would be existential."
Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, Lowy Institute.1
The analysis points to the Treaty on Common Security that Australia and Indonesia signed in February 2026, under which the two governments consult on threats to their shared security. It recommends using those consultations to draw up contingency plans for keeping the sea lanes open in a crisis.1
As of 18 November this site found no published plan. The open question for Australian exporters is whether the treaty's consultations will produce one before the next disruption, and whether Indonesia will designate its east-west lanes, which would settle the rules for ships that use them, as the Lowy analysis notes those lanes are not yet designated.1