Sudan's energy ministry announced on 12 October 2026 that qualified national companies could compete to import aviation fuel and furnace oil. Its statement retains central-bank approval for financial letters and guarantees tied to 200 kilograms of gold, with importing groups limited to four companies. Opening participation therefore does not remove the banking conditions.1
The ministry described its objective as ending exclusivity in those products.1
فتح باب المنافسة
Opening competition.1
The statement names jet A1 and furnace oil specifically. It should not be read as an automatic authorisation for every company to import petrol and diesel, or as confirmation that new supplies had already arrived. It sets the conditions for participation in a defined part of the fuel market.1
Gold deposits sit behind the import paperwork
The central bank's earlier circular, dated 16 June, requires a Sudanese petroleum importer to deposit 200 kilograms of 21-carat gold as collateral at the Sudan Gold Refinery before banks enter import arrangements. Its instructions require an official certificate identifying the guarantor, gold type, weight, deposit date and validity.2
Banks must verify the certificate with the refinery and confirm its validity before executing the import transaction. Other import controls continue to apply. These procedures make the refinery's evidence part of the banking decision, alongside the firm's ability to arrange a cargo. The circular describes collateral deposited to support the operation, rather than a purchase of fuel in exchange for gold.2
Importers challenge the effect on competition
The October opening followed a memorandum from 24 oil companies to the head of Sudan's Sovereignty Council. Sudan Tribune reported on 6 October that the companies sought common, transparent qualification standards, more flexible guarantees and a published mechanism for allocating fuel among distributors. They argued that restricting imports to a small group weakened competition and disrupted supplies.3
Those are the companies' claims about the market, not a measured finding that collateral alone caused shortages. Their warning concerned higher fuel and operating costs for productive sectors, with possible consequences for output and exports. The newspaper also reported renewed queues at filling stations, providing evidence of supply pressure without isolating its causes.3
A later report offered a narrower sign of movement. Akher Khabar, citing Sudan Fact, said on 4 November that Al-Nahla Petroleum had obtained permissions for three cargoes: two of diesel and one of petrol. It reported that the company planned to finance them from its own resources, rather than central-bank funding.4
The report expected arrival at Port Sudan on 14–15 November. That forecast and the permits are not confirmation that the vessels arrived, discharged or supplied retailers. It also distinguishes these permissions from earlier instructions concerning a separate Al-Nahla vessel's port procedures. The immediate checkpoint is completed unloading and distribution, followed by evidence of whether similar permissions become available to other qualified importers.4