South Korea has almost no direct trade with North Korea to lose, because bringing North Korean goods into the South needs prior approval from the Unification Minister, and the Constitutional Court upheld that rule on 17 September 2026.1 What exposes Seoul is indirect: North Korea-China trade rose 25.7% in 2025, according to a South Korean government-funded institute, and Seoul has joined Western sanctions on Russia without banning Russian materials.2 4 This article sets out what Korean-language sources and officials say. We did not find a new statement from South Korea's trade ministry on the North Korea question.
The domestic rule: approval, and a court that upheld it
Article 13(1) of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act requires anyone who brings goods from North Korea into the South to get the Unification Minister's approval first. Article 27(1)(3) punishes unapproved imports.1 On 17 September 2026 the Constitutional Court upheld both by 8 votes to 1, in a case begun by a man fined 3 million won for importing 146 items through Incheon Airport in 2018.1 The majority said central handling serves orderly inter-Korean exchange and that full liberalisation is hard while tensions persist.1
단지 승인을 갖추지 못했다는 사실에 대한 제재를 함에 있어 형사 처벌을 하는 것은 과도하다.
Imposing criminal punishment merely for lacking approval is excessive. (Justice Jung Gye-sun, dissenting)1
The ruling concerns Seoul's own rule, not UN sanctions. It shows that the South Korean state treats goods from the North as a matter for the Unification Ministry, not for the trade ministry's ordinary import regime.1
The China channel
The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), a government-funded institute, put North Korea's 2025 trade with China up 25.7% in a report of 23 March 2026. North Korean imports from China were US$2.2947 billion, up 25.2%, and its exports to China US$440.18 million, up 26.1%.2 The goods deficit was about US$1.85 billion, about 5.8% of North Korea's nominal GDP by KIEP's estimate, or about US$1.2 billion after allowing for informal trade.2 KIEP says imports of agricultural goods, chemicals, textiles and plastics have returned to levels of 2015 and 2016, before UN sanctions were tightened. It finds that Russian trade did not offset the China growth, and that Chinese local governments drove it.2
북중 무역은 정책적 활성화 기조에 힘입어 완만한 회복세를 이어갈 전망
North Korea-China trade is expected to keep recovering gradually, helped by a policy push to revive it.2
KIEP recommends that Seoul prepare for deeper North Korea-China economic cooperation while US-North Korea relations stay stalled.2 The report does not assess compliance with sanctions directly.2
Enforcement and the Russia link
Opposition lawmaker Yu Yong-weon, citing the National Intelligence Service (NIS), said in June that North Korea exported about 1.5 million tonnes of coal in 2025 and imported refined oil from China and Russia at more than seven times the UN cap of 500,000 barrels. He also cited foreign ministry data showing no new South Korean unilateral sanctions on the North since June 2025.3 These are the opposition's claims, relayed from intelligence figures that we could not check.3
South Korea's exposure to Russia is separate and commercial. The JoongAng Daily reports, from customs data, that Korea imported 483,084 tonnes of Russian aluminium in 2025, up 41%, making Russia its top supplier for the first time. It says Seoul joined Western sanctions on Russia in advanced-technology export controls and finance but stopped short of banning Russian energy and materials.4 An analyst at KIEP says Russian imports do not automatically make a firm a secondary-sanctions target, and that the nearer risk is financial restrictions and US pressure on Korean exports.4
What the sources do not settle
International press adds that Pyongyang has strengthened ties with Russia since talks with Washington broke down in 2019. In August, President Trump tied his order to cut joint drills to Seoul's refusal to help in the US-Israel war on Iran; that is the US president's stated reason, which Seoul did not endorse.6
The sources agree that Seoul's direct trade is negligible and that the growth is in China-North Korea and Russia-North Korea links. They do not say how much Korean firms are exposed to US secondary measures, and none quotes a ministry on it.2 3 4 No source we opened gives a figure for South Korean trade with North Korea in 2025 or 2026. The next test is whether Washington adds sanctions in the weeks after Kim Yo Jong's 4 November statement; Korean analysts expect some, which is their forecast, not an announced policy.5