Russian rapeseed-oil exports rose over the first nine months of 2026, but a sharp September decline and Chinese restrictions on individual plants complicate the picture. OleoScope figures reported by Kommersant put January–September exports at 1.14 million tonnes, up 4%, with China taking 85%. September shipments fell more than 40% from a year earlier to about 130,000 tonnes.1
IKAR director Dmitry Rylko told the newspaper that some product could not enter China because tests had found traces of genetically modified organisms, or GMOs. Finding an alternative market of comparable importance was difficult, he said. The aggregate figures show a monthly setback alongside cumulative growth; they do not isolate how much of the change came from testing restrictions.1
The Russian regulator puts responsibility on processors
Rosselkhoznadzor told Agroinvestor in August that Chinese authorities had restricted supplies from 23 Russian establishments during February–April 2026. A further 35 were under additional control. The regulator said the restricted list was unchanged at the end of July. These are dated regulatory accounts, not a newly verified November plant list.2
The agency said controls needed to follow the crop:
начиная с этапа выращивания
starting at the cultivation stage.2
It placed responsibility on processing plants to prevent unsuitable raw material entering finished export consignments, while also noting farmers' responsibilities. Russian laboratories had adapted testing procedures after studying Chinese practice; differing test systems had contributed to inconsistent results, the regulator said.2
The practical issue therefore starts before loading oil for export. A processor needs evidence about incoming seed and its own production controls, not simply a buyer willing to purchase the finished product.2
Industry explanations remain contested
The Russian Oil and Fat Union told Agroinvestor on 6 August that mills were developing joint raw-material testing programmes with growers. It described continuing Chinese demand but said actual deliveries would depend on restoring access for restricted plants.3
The union raised possible false positives associated with cauliflower mosaic virus, while also alleging that unofficial imports of modified rapeseed from other Eurasian Economic Union countries contaminated supplies. These are explanations advanced by Russian participants; the report does not establish a single cause for every rejected consignment.3
China's published rules provide a separate regulatory context. Its GMO labelling catalogue includes rapeseed oil and meal, and covered genetically modified products cannot be imported or sold without compliant labels. That framework is not a blanket prohibition on all genetically modified food.4
Separate Chinese import-safety rules require authorisation for agricultural GMOs used as processing materials. Goods lacking the necessary certificates or inconsistent with their approvals can be returned or destroyed. These general rules explain why identifying a product's status matters, but do not independently determine whether a disputed Russian test was correct.5
The open question is which corrective measures China will accept for restricted Russian plants, and whether reinstatement produces sustained deliveries rather than another interruption at the testing stage.2 3