Russia's defence minister, Andrei Belousov, said in Pyongyang on 26 April 2026 that Russia and North Korea had agreed to place their military cooperation on a "stable, long-term footing", and that Russia is ready to sign a cooperation plan for 2027 to 2031 later this year, according to an AFP report.1 That is the only dated, official commitment this review found. No Russian or North Korean customs total for goods traded between the two countries was found, so the exchange can be described but not measured.
What Moscow says in public
Belousov's statement, as relayed by AFP, was that the two defence ministries had agreed the arrangement. He presented awards to North Korean soldiers who fought in the Kursk operation, and the Russian parliamentary speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, thanked North Korean troops for their part in it.1 These are statements by Russian officials; they confirm the military link but give no figures for arms or goods.
On civilian trade, the Russian co-chair of the joint intergovernmental commission, Natural Resources Minister Alexander Kozlov, spoke to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti in December 2025. He reported about 4,000 Russian tourists in North Korea in 2024 and about 7,000 expected in 2025, against just over 1,000 in 2019, plus the first direct Moscow to Pyongyang flights in 77 years.2
Частоту рейсов пока сохраняем, но уже видим растущую динамику спроса.
We are keeping the flight frequency for now, but we already see demand growing.2
The report carried no trade figures.2
What Seoul and outside analysts claim
The list of what North Korea receives comes mainly from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) and from analysts, not from either government concerned. Kyunghyang Shinmun reported on 30 April 2025 that the NIS read the public acknowledgement of the troop deployment as a compromise between Kim Jong Un and Putin, and expected Pyongyang to demand compensation:3
북한이 반대급부를 요구하고
North Korea demands something in return3
The article did not list specific payments or any cash.3 The Korea Economic Institute of America, a Washington think tank, writes that Pyongyang supplies weapons and troops and that Russia gives weapons technology, food, oil and tourism in return, with no dollar values attached.4 The AFP report likewise says analysts see financial aid, military technology, food and energy flowing to North Korea, which they say helps it get around sanctions.1 Neither Moscow nor Pyongyang has endorsed those descriptions of payment.
The economic effect is estimated, not counted
The Bank of Korea estimated that North Korea's economy grew 3.5% in 2025, the third year in a row above 3%. Sidae's report on the estimate, published 31 July 2026, attributes the growth mainly to cooperation with Russia and weapons exports, with some help from trade with China.5 Those are the central bank's inferences, since North Korea does not publish national accounts. KEIA cautions that the estimates should be treated with care for the same reason.4
Flour is the one Russian export to North Korea with a published value, covered separately on this site. Otherwise the arms-for-goods exchange stays a set of unpriced claims.
The next test is whether Russia and North Korea sign the 2027 to 2031 military cooperation plan that Belousov said was ready, which may show whether any trade terms are written down.1