Trade War

Russia-North Korea arms-for-goods exchange rests on claims, with no published trade total

Moscow confirms military cooperation with Pyongyang and plans a 2027-2031 agreement, but neither side publishes what is traded. The list of Russian payments comes from Seoul's intelligence service and outside analysts.

Other countries 18 November 2026

Russia's defence minister, Andrei Belousov, said in Pyongyang on 26 April 2026 that Russia and North Korea had agreed to place their military cooperation on a "stable, long-term footing", and that Russia is ready to sign a cooperation plan for 2027 to 2031 later this year, according to an AFP report.1 That is the only dated, official commitment this review found. No Russian or North Korean customs total for goods traded between the two countries was found, so the exchange can be described but not measured.

What Moscow says in public

Belousov's statement, as relayed by AFP, was that the two defence ministries had agreed the arrangement. He presented awards to North Korean soldiers who fought in the Kursk operation, and the Russian parliamentary speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, thanked North Korean troops for their part in it.1 These are statements by Russian officials; they confirm the military link but give no figures for arms or goods.

On civilian trade, the Russian co-chair of the joint intergovernmental commission, Natural Resources Minister Alexander Kozlov, spoke to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti in December 2025. He reported about 4,000 Russian tourists in North Korea in 2024 and about 7,000 expected in 2025, against just over 1,000 in 2019, plus the first direct Moscow to Pyongyang flights in 77 years.2

Частоту рейсов пока сохраняем, но уже видим растущую динамику спроса.

We are keeping the flight frequency for now, but we already see demand growing.2

The report carried no trade figures.2

What Seoul and outside analysts claim

The list of what North Korea receives comes mainly from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) and from analysts, not from either government concerned. Kyunghyang Shinmun reported on 30 April 2025 that the NIS read the public acknowledgement of the troop deployment as a compromise between Kim Jong Un and Putin, and expected Pyongyang to demand compensation:3

북한이 반대급부를 요구하고

North Korea demands something in return3

The article did not list specific payments or any cash.3 The Korea Economic Institute of America, a Washington think tank, writes that Pyongyang supplies weapons and troops and that Russia gives weapons technology, food, oil and tourism in return, with no dollar values attached.4 The AFP report likewise says analysts see financial aid, military technology, food and energy flowing to North Korea, which they say helps it get around sanctions.1 Neither Moscow nor Pyongyang has endorsed those descriptions of payment.

The economic effect is estimated, not counted

The Bank of Korea estimated that North Korea's economy grew 3.5% in 2025, the third year in a row above 3%. Sidae's report on the estimate, published 31 July 2026, attributes the growth mainly to cooperation with Russia and weapons exports, with some help from trade with China.5 Those are the central bank's inferences, since North Korea does not publish national accounts. KEIA cautions that the estimates should be treated with care for the same reason.4

Flour is the one Russian export to North Korea with a published value, covered separately on this site. Otherwise the arms-for-goods exchange stays a set of unpriced claims.

The next test is whether Russia and North Korea sign the 2027 to 2031 military cooperation plan that Belousov said was ready, which may show whether any trade terms are written down.1

Sources

  1. AFP via The News International. Russia, North Korea agree to long-term military cooperation. 27 April 2026Independent camp · wire service quoting the Russian defence ministry
  2. Profile (RIA Novosti interview). Россия и КНДР разрабатывают новые туристические программы [Russia and North Korea develop new tourism programmes]. 26 December 2025Russia's camp · press reporting a government minister · in Russian
  3. Kyunghyang Shinmun. 국정원 북한군 러시아 파병 공식 인정 분석 [NIS analysis of the North Korean troop deployment acknowledgement]. 30 April 2025South Korea's camp · press reporting the intelligence service · in Korean
  4. Korea Economic Institute of America. Arms Sales to Russia and Trade With China Drive North Korea's Economic Recovery. 2 September 2026Independent camp · think tank
  5. Sidae. 한국은행 2025 북한 경제성장률 추정 결과 [Bank of Korea estimate of North Korea's 2025 growth]. 31 July 2026South Korea's camp · press reporting the central bank · in Korean

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