Russia and Iran have taken another administrative step towards completing the Rasht–Astara railway, a missing section of their planned north–south freight route. Documents announced on 5 November 2026 give contractors access to land along the line for engineering surveys. They advance preparation for construction, rather than opening a railway on which exporters can already book through freight.1
Kommersant, reporting Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Nikitin's account, said Russia's Caspian Service and Iran's transport-infrastructure company CDTIC signed the access protocol and an additional contractual agreement in Tehran. Surveyors had already established a geodetic reference network and taken aerial photographs. Hydrometeorological investigations and topographic surveying were identified as the next work.1
Approval and land availability address different constraints
Iranian Deputy Roads Minister Hooshang Bazvand subsequently said the Supreme National Security Council had ratified the bilateral agreement. Speaking to Tasnim on 8 November, he explained that approval had been required from either parliament or the council. Russia had sought an Iranian approval process corresponding to its own parliamentary procedure.2
Bazvand also said the remaining 37 kilometres of land had been handed over for studies and field assessments, making the full 162-kilometre route available. That account establishes the government's stated position on access. It does not demonstrate that track has been laid throughout the corridor or that commercial trains have begun operating.2
The missing link is part of a wider transport network
Russia's Transport Ministry describes Rasht–Astara as the western corridor's:
недостающее инфраструктурное звено
missing infrastructure link.3
In its account of bilateral discussions on 27 October, the ministry identified land purchases and arrangements to exempt the project from Iranian taxes and charges among the implementation issues. These are practical conditions for supplying construction services and equipment across a border. An agreement on the strategic value of a route does not settle every administrative requirement for building it.3
The ministry also reported growth in existing rail and sea transport between Russia and Iran during 2026, without publishing a volume in that statement. Existing trade and the proposed new line should therefore be kept separate: current cargo can move through other parts of the transport network while this missing section remains unfinished.3
Construction timing still limits the commercial promise
Russian Railways deputy chief executive Sergei Pavlov told Interfax on 15 October that construction was expected to start in 2027 and take three years under the intergovernmental agreement. He said survey work had resumed after an interruption caused by fighting in the region. Those were the railway executive's expectations, not a confirmed commissioning date.4
Interfax describes the North–South corridor as a multimodal network with western, eastern and trans-Caspian branches. The planned line therefore improves one part of a broader connection linking Russia with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Freight forecasts for the completed project are potential future throughput, not additional exports already recorded.4
The next substantive checkpoint is whether the newly available land and approvals translate into the construction start Russia's railway management anticipates.2 4