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Norway clarifies military-use risk in research technology-transfer licences

September instructions clarify Norway's treatment of sensitive technology shared with foreign researchers. Academic exemptions remain limited, while regulators must identify a concrete risk when assessing military use.

Rare earths and export controls 18 November 2026

Norway's Foreign Ministry has instructed its export-control agency that a general or hypothetical risk is insufficient grounds for refusing a technology-transfer licence on military-use grounds. The instruction, effective from 1 September 2026, guides implementation of the country's revised controls on sensitive technology, including transfers to foreign nationals within Norway.1

En generell eller hypotetisk risiko er ikke i seg selv grunnlag for avslag.

A general or hypothetical risk does not itself justify refusal.1

The agency, DEKSA, must have information clearly indicating an unacceptable risk of diversion to unwanted military use. The instruction permits a risk-based approach and provides for individual and global technology-transfer licences. It is a direction on licensing practice, rather than a general exemption for research partnerships.1

An academic collaboration can involve an export

The Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills explains that the framework covers information needed to develop, produce or use controlled goods. In academic work, this reaches relevant technical data and assistance, rather than every exchange of knowledge. Institutions must make an initial classification and establish a close connection between the technology and a particular controlled item.2

Its guidance identifies an exemption for transfers in Norway to citizens of European Economic Area or NATO countries at universities, colleges, specified research institutes and healthcare enterprises, covering the dual-use and national critical-technology lists. It also distinguishes merely uploading material to cloud storage from authorising a foreign national to read it: the person granting access is treated as the exporter. These details make access arrangements important alongside the location of laboratory equipment.2

Universities must assess access before collaboration changes

NTNU, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, treats export controls as one element of research security alongside national-security rules and international sanctions. Its guidance identifies the possibility of uncontrolled transfer for military purposes, interference by foreign actors and data breaches. The university says the purpose of these checks is to protect and enable free, independent research.3

Researchers are asked to consider external partners, cloud services, publication and sharing at courses or conferences. NTNU's assessment form helps staff identify relevant risks, but the university explicitly says the form is not an approval process. It is a basis for planning with colleagues, managers, personnel staff and security advisers. An internal assessment therefore does not itself supply a government licence.3

The institutional division also matters. Store norske leksikon, the independently edited Norwegian encyclopaedia, explains that DEKSA issues licences and handles sanctions cases, while the Foreign Ministry retains responsibility for policy and rules. The agency, established on 1 January 2025, works with customs and the security service on enforcement and can draw on specialist scientific and radiation expertise in individual cases.4

For research groups, a decision at the start of a project may not settle later transfers. NTNU calls for reassessment when collaboration opportunities, recruitment or visiting researchers change. The next practical test is whether those new arrangements alter who can access controlled information and require a fresh licensing assessment before access is granted.3

Sources

  1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. EI-01/2026 - Instruks om praksis for lisensiering og veiledning knyttet til teknologioverføring [Instruction on licensing and guidance for technology transfer]. 1 September 2026Norway's camp · government · in Norwegian
  2. Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills. Eksportkontroll, internasjonale sanksjoner og oppholdstillatelse [Export controls, international sanctions and residence permits]. 9 February 2026Norway's camp · government · in Norwegian
  3. NTNU. Assess export control and security in research. Accessed 18 November 2026Independent camp · university guidance
  4. Store norske leksikon. Eksportkontroll [Export control]. Accessed 18 November 2026Independent camp · encyclopaedia · in Norwegian

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