Israel's Defence Ministry reported US$19.2 billion of new defence export contracts signed in 2025, nearly 30% more than the previous year. The figure, published on 2 June 2026, covers agreements secured by manufacturers with government support. It should not be read as a customs tally of equipment delivered abroad during the same period.1
Government-to-government agreements accounted for about US$10 billion of the total. The ministry presents these relationships as part of its industrial policy, supporting domestic military requirements as well as overseas sales. Its account links the expansion to new markets, partnerships and changes in export regulation, while retaining protection for sensitive technology.1
Large orders concentrate the business
Calcalist reports that contracts worth at least US$100 million represented 53% of the year's value. Europe accounted for 36% of the export agreements, ahead of Asia and the Pacific at 32%. That concentration means a small number of large procurement decisions can materially affect the annual total.2
The newspaper describes manufacturers facing protests and attempts to exclude them from international exhibitions while still securing orders. It attributes part of the sales effort to the demonstrated use of equipment in combat. That is the industry's commercial argument, not evidence that political objections or restrictions have disappeared in every destination market.2
The ministry itself recognises the production challenge. Director-general Amir Baram called for investment in research and the expansion of manufacturing lines, describing the latter as:1
הרחבת קווי הייצור בתעשיות
Expanding production lines in industry.1
Transfer statistics answer a different question
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, places Israel seventh among suppliers of major arms in 2021–25, with 4.4% of the global total. It calculates that Israeli transfers rose 56% from the preceding five-year period. Its measure tracks the volume of major weapons transferred using a standardised indicator, rather than summing the dollar value of new contracts.3
SIPRI identifies strong demand for air-defence systems alongside reluctance among some governments to purchase Israeli weapons because of the civilian death toll in Gaza. It records India, Germany and the United States as Israel's largest recipients over the five-year period. Those recipient shares cannot simply be substituted for the ministry's breakdown of one year's new agreements.3
Associated Press reports that the ministry did not identify individual buyers in its annual announcement. Its coverage also records opposing interpretations of the use of combat experience in marketing: protesters criticised the destruction in Gaza being used to demonstrate weapons, while the ministry denied treating battlefields as testing grounds. The disagreement concerns the conduct and presentation of the trade, even where both sides acknowledge continuing sales.4
The remaining commercial question is how the new contracts translate into production and eventual deliveries while manufacturers also meet Israeli military demand. The order book and the independent transfer series establish different stages of that process; neither alone supplies the delivery timetable for the newly signed agreements.1 3