An analysis of Iranian petroleum shipments distinguishes continuing product movements from the interruption to crude exports. Iran Open Data reported on 15 November 2026 that Kpler figures it had examined showed product traffic through Hormuz since the US blockade resumed. It cautioned that passage through the strait does not prove every cargo crossed the blockade line.1
The analysis describes the continuing product trade as occurring:
با وجود سقوط شدید
Despite a steep decline.1
Its estimate was about 220,000 barrels a day of petroleum products moving through Hormuz between 14 July and the end of October 2026, with LPG, principally propane and butane, making up more than 60%. This is a measure of movements through the waterway, not a verified total of cargoes delivered to foreign customers. The report also notes that Kpler's coverage concerns maritime shipments and excludes land exports.1
A renewed blockade with different tracking measures
US Central Command's release confirms that the blockade of vessels travelling to or from Iranian ports and coastal areas resumed on 14 July 2026. The statement linked that resumption with military action intended to reduce threats to commercial shipping. The July measure was a resumption, rather than the first introduction of a blockade.2
United Against Nuclear Iran, a US advocacy group that monitors tankers, reported on 9 November 2026 that approximately eleven small vessels carrying Iranian LPG had passed the blockade line since its reinstatement. It said it had not tracked an Iranian crude tanker successfully leaving the Gulf of Oman and avoiding US enforcement since 12 July, before the blockade resumed.3
UANI also identified at least 56 laden tankers operating along Iran's coast. Their presence illustrates why loading a vessel, crossing Hormuz and reaching a customer are separate stages. The group's observations do not turn every tanker movement into a completed export sale.3
Washington disputes what vessel movements establish
Iranian news agency Tasnim's Persian coverage, published on 17 October 2026, highlighted Reuters' reporting that some LPG and aviation-fuel shipments had continued despite the restrictions. It also carried the monitoring group's assessment that most tankers containing Iranian products had been redirected. This was Iranian media coverage of external tracking, rather than a government shipment total.4
Reuters' report on 16 October 2026 included satellite analysis indicating that an Iranian jet-fuel cargo reached Myanmar in September. It said Tehran had not responded to its request for comment. The report also gave Washington's objections to interpreting tracked movements as proof that vessels had evaded enforcement.5
A US military official told Reuters that ships were assessed individually and some could pass for humanitarian reasons. Sanctions-list status was not the sole enforcement criterion. A Treasury spokesperson separately warned that vessels could falsify identities or reported locations, challenging the reliability of inferences from tracking alone.5
The unresolved issue is how much product ultimately reaches overseas buyers and generates revenue. The November estimates illuminate different parts of that chain, but neither transit counts nor observed departures establish the final proceeds received by Iranian exporters.1 3