Deutsche Telekom said on 5 November 2026 that it had no Chinese equipment in its core or optical network, as Germany approaches its deadline for removing critical Huawei and ZTE components from public mobile core networks. Chief executive Timotheus Höttges also said the operator was developing its own radio-network controller software and selling it to Vodafone and Telefónica in Germany.1
The government's March parliamentary answer explains the legal arrangement behind the deadline. It concluded public-law contracts with Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica, ending administrative proceedings brought under the former cybersecurity law. The government described these instruments as follows.2
öffentlich-rechtliche Verträge
public-law contracts.2
Under the contracts, the operators must stop using critical Huawei and ZTE components in their fifth-generation mobile core networks by the end of 2026. A separate deadline at the end of 2029 covers replacing critical functions of those suppliers' network-management systems in access and transport networks with other manufacturers' technical solutions. The distinction matters: the timetable is defined by network function, rather than a single removal date for every piece of Chinese-made equipment.2
Certification is a separate requirement
Germany also regulates the technical certification of critical components through its telecoms security framework. A Bundesnetzagentur order requires covered components to be checked by a recognised certification body before first deployment after the applicable deadline. Its transition formula depends on when certification for the product becomes possible, with the earliest cut-off set at 1 January 2026. It is not a universal retrospective certification deadline for every installed component.3
The order says existing components already in use need not be certified retrospectively under that provision. Where certification is not yet available, operators must take appropriate technical precautions and other protective measures. For equipment suppliers, this creates a product-assurance requirement alongside the separate restrictions affecting particular vendors and network functions. Passing a technical process and satisfying a supplier-replacement obligation answer different regulatory questions.3
The Bundesnetzagentur is also revising its security catalogue under the Telecommunications Act. Its published consultation describes updated measures differentiated by risk level and revisions to the list of critical functions. The consultation on that draft closed on 16 January 2026; the regulator's page continues to identify the earlier catalogue as currently valid. The consultation text should therefore not be read as proof that every proposed expansion is already binding.4
Operators question further replacement costs
Höttges used the November earnings call to argue against wider European replacement requirements. He warned that additional spending could delay deployment of the next mobile-network generation. These were the operator's views about possible further policy changes, separate from its report of progress under the existing German arrangement. His account of selling controller software also shows replacement work involving software development and licensing, alongside equipment procurement.1
For the current contracts, the next deadline remains the end of 2026. The outstanding implementation question is whether each covered operator completes the required core-network replacement, while preparing for the later management-system deadline.2