Georgia's Kulevi refinery is trying to preserve access to European business by replacing Russian feedstock before a deferred EU transaction ban takes effect on 25 January 2027. Its operator, Black Sea Petroleum, says it completed the switch on 23 August 2026 and received a third Libyan crude cargo on 28 October 2026. Those are company-reported changes in supply, not confirmation that the EU has removed the refinery's listing.1 2
The European Commission says the postponement gives Kulevi time to diversify away from Russian crude. Transactions with the refinery are not prohibited by that deferred measure during the window, although other applicable restrictions still matter. The Council will decide whether the listing remains necessary following a Commission assessment.2
A new input route for a Georgian plant
Georgian business outlet BM reported that the tanker FRANKOPAN delivered approximately 86,000 tonnes of Libyan crude to the SOCAR-owned Kulevi terminal in late October. Its account described a continuing supply programme and said the refinery had also begun processing Kazakh crude in July. The distinction between terminal and refinery is important: the terminal receives cargo, while BSP owns and operates the processing plant.3
BM described the supply change in Georgian:3
არარუსული წარმოშობის ნედლი ნავთობის მიწოდება გრძელდება
Supplies of crude oil of non-Russian origin are continuing.3
In its November factsheet, BSP describes independent verification, monitoring and reporting arrangements, including origin and vessel checks. These are the operator's stated compliance measures, not an EU certification of its activities. They concern the evidence behind its reported change of feedstock.1
Current deliveries and planned output are different
The plant's ambitions are larger than the cargoes already reported. BM says BSP aims to supply more than 100,000 tonnes of petroleum products a month to the EU. That is a sales objective, not a measured monthly export series. The same report describes a supply agreement extending through the end of 2027, giving the operator a prospective basis for continued non-Russian purchases.3
BSP's separate factsheet sets out a proposed expansion to as much as 5 million tonnes of annual refining capacity. It says uncertainty surrounding the listing is obstructing financing. This is a useful example of a regulatory effect on possible future output: a plant may secure replacement feedstock while lenders still hesitate over its eventual access to customers and suppliers. Neither the capacity target nor the financing complaint establishes completed investment or lost production.1
Port traffic cannot establish refinery output
Independent monitoring also requires careful boundaries. In an October correction, the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air distinguished Kulevi port and terminal activity from the refinery's operations. It acknowledged that port export figures, including shipments before the refinery started operating, do not establish refinery output, and that BSP says it does not own or operate the terminal.4
The correction also recorded no Russian crude unloadings at Kulevi port in September. That observation supports scrutiny of a changing supply route, but it cannot by itself verify every feedstock purchase or prove that every exported product came from this refinery.4
The next regulatory test is the Council's decision on whether to retain the refinery's listing, with the deferred transaction ban scheduled to apply from 25 January 2027.2