Trade War

EU carbon levy, year one: Mozambique's smelter idle over power, Egypt counts a possible cost

The EU carbon border levy has applied since 1 January 2026. Mozambique's only aluminium smelter has been idle since March over power costs. An Egyptian study reported by Annahar puts the possible burden on Egypt's exporters at up to $317 million a year.

Effects 17 November 2026

The European Union's carbon border levy entered its definitive phase on 1 January 2026, and two African exporters of goods it covers have had very different years. Mozambique's aluminium smelter Mozal, which sent nearly all of its metal to the EU, went into care and maintenance on 15 March 2026; its owner said it could not secure enough affordable electricity. In Egypt, a study by the Institute of National Planning, reported in the Lebanese daily Annahar on 3 November, estimates that exporters of covered goods could bear up to $317 million a year.1 3 4 7

What the measure is

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) makes EU importers of certain carbon-intensive goods buy certificates for the emissions released in making them. The European Commission says importers bringing in more than 50 tonnes of such goods must become authorised declarants, declare the emissions embedded in their imports and surrender certificates each year. The certificate price follows the auction price of allowances in the EU's own emissions trading system.1

Certificates go on sale from February 2027. The Commission's price page says all certificates will be bought on a common central platform from that month, and that each quarterly price for 2026 applies to goods imported in that quarter. It lists €75.36 a tonne of carbon dioxide for the first quarter, €75.28 for the second and €82.32 for the third.2

Mozambique: an exposed export that stopped for another reason

Mozal has a capacity of about 560,000 tonnes a year and is majority-owned by Australia's South32. A July 2026 policy brief from the International Growth Centre (IGC), a research organisation, cites the World Bureau of Metal Statistics for the finding that in the 12 months from March 2025 Mozal exported over 99% of its output to the EU. An earlier IGC post, dated 18 September 2025, put the potential levy on Mozal's annual exports at €78.4 million, assuming about €70 for each tonne of carbon dioxide.3 5

South32's chief executive, Graham Kerr, said on 12 February that the plant would go into care and maintenance in March because it could not secure enough affordable electricity. Mozambique's minister of mineral resources and energy, Estêvão Pale, told reporters that week, as carried by the Portuguese broadcaster RTP from the news agency Lusa:6

O Governo está a fazer tudo o que é necessário para garantir que a fábrica não entre em manutenção.

The government is doing everything necessary to ensure that the plant does not go into maintenance.6

South32 confirmed on 16 March that Mozal had entered care and maintenance the day before. Lusa, citing the Bank of Mozambique's latest report, wrote on 21 July that exports of aluminium bars earned $371.4 million between January and March 2026, after a record $1,346.9 million in the whole of 2025. Lusa also reported that the only formal power offer, from South Africa's Eskom, was almost $100 a megawatt-hour, and that South32 had not ruled out restarting.4 8

The IGC brief argues that the levy's design hides Mozal's main advantage. For aluminium, CBAM charges only direct emissions, not those from the electricity used, and Mozal draws most of its power from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam. Under present rules, the authors write, Mozal pays nearly the same charge as smelters on coal-heavy grids. If electricity emissions were priced, they estimate a cost of roughly €140 for each tonne of aluminium for Mozal against €800 to €1,100 for Indian, Chinese or South African competitors. The Commission is due to report in 2027 on whether to include them.3

Egypt: fertiliser, steel and a domestic debate

Annahar reported that a study published in July 2026 by Egypt's Institute of National Planning valued Egyptian fertiliser exports to the EU at about $993 million in 2024, or 45.4% of the sector's exports. In a scenario with no domestic carbon tax, the institute projected a 3.86% fall in fertiliser exports in 2026. The paper stressed that this is a model estimate, not a recorded loss. The $317 million figure covers all Egyptian exporters of covered goods and depends on the study's assumptions.7

On the industry side, Ahmed Kamal, executive director of the environmental compliance office of the Federation of Egyptian Industries, told the Egyptian business daily Al Borsa on 7 July that about 50% of the iron and steel plants exporting to the EU had begun applying the mechanism's requirements, and that 90% of exporting fertiliser plants had reached advanced levels of compliance. The paper reported his account of the office's lending:9

قال كمال، إن إجمالي التمويلات التي وفرها المكتب بلغ نحو 1.2 مليار جنيه من خلال نظام القرض الدوار، مضيفا أن أكثر من 750 مصنعا استفاد من تلك التمويلات منذ إطلاق البرنامج.

Kamal said the total financing provided by the office had reached about 1.2 billion pounds through the revolving loan scheme, adding that more than 750 factories had benefited from that financing since the programme was launched.9

Annahar, writing about Egypt, and the IGC post on Mozambique make the same point about money: without a domestic carbon price, the cost attached to an exporter's emissions can go to the EU and not to the exporting state.5 7

What comes next

The Commission's table shows the fourth-quarter 2026 price due for publication on 4 January 2027, with certificate sales from February 2027 and weekly prices from 2027 onwards. No date for a restart of Mozal was found in the sources read.2 8

Sources

  1. European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union. CBAM definitive regime. Accessed 17 November 2026European Union's camp · government
  2. European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union. Price of CBAM certificates. Accessed 17 November 2026European Union's camp · government
  3. International Growth Centre. The missing carbon signal: How CBAM's exclusion of scope 2 emissions undermines its climate/trade objectives, policy brief MOZ-25277. July 2026Independent camp · think tank
  4. Lusa, carried by the Alliance of Mediterranean News Agencies. Mozambique: Mozal produced 248,000 t. aluminium before closure in March. 4 May 2026Independent camp · wire service
  5. International Growth Centre. Mozambique's strategic responses to CBAM. 18 September 2025Independent camp · think tank
  6. RTP, carrying Lusa. Autralianos garantem que maior indústria moçambicana suspende atividade em março [Australians confirm that Mozambique's largest industry suspends activity in March]. 12 February 2026Portugal's camp · public broadcaster carrying a wire report on the minister and the company · in Portuguese
  7. Annahar. عشية مؤتمر COP31: ضريبة الكربون الأوروبية... هل تخسر المصانع العربية أسواقها؟ [On the eve of COP31: the European carbon tax... will Arab factories lose their markets?]. 3 November 2026Lebanon's camp · press reporting an Egyptian institute · in Arabic
  8. Lusa, carried by Club of Mozambique. Mozambican aluminum exports secure 317.3M EUR until Mozal's closure. 21 July 2026Mozambique's camp · press carrying a wire report on the central bank
  9. Al Borsa. "الالتزام البيئى": 50% من مصانع الحديد المُصدّرة لأوروبا بدأت تطبيق "آلية الكربون" ["Environmental Compliance": 50% of iron plants exporting to Europe have begun applying the "carbon mechanism"]. 7 July 2026Egypt's camp · press reporting the industry federation · in Arabic

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