The 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), the main trade pact between China and Taiwan, remains formally in force, but China has withdrawn its preferential tariff rates on 146 product lines of Taiwanese origin in two steps, in January and June 2024.1 2 Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council says the goods still covered now make up a record-low share of Taiwan's sales to China, while China's Taiwan Affairs Office says the fault lies with Taiwan's government.3 5 This article sets out what each side says; it found no new suspension announced in 2026.
What Beijing suspended, and why
The ECFA's "early harvest" list gave Taiwanese goods lower Chinese tariffs from 2011 onwards. In December 2023 the State Council Tariff Commission suspended the ECFA rate on 12 tariff lines, including propylene and p-xylene, from 1 January 2024.1 A second notice, dated 30 May 2024, suspended 134 more lines from 15 June 2024.2 Neither notice sets an end date.1 2
China's stated reason is the same in both. The second notice says:
台湾地区单方面对大陆产品出口采取歧视性的禁止、限制等措施,违反了《海峡两岸经济合作框架协议》规定。
Taiwan unilaterally imposes discriminatory bans and restrictions on exports of mainland products, in breach of the ECFA.2
The affected goods include petrochemicals, textiles, machinery, steel and transport equipment, which return to Chinese tariffs of roughly 1% to 12%, according to a Taiwanese press report on the second notice.4 Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs said those goods were worth about US$9.8 billion in 2023, around 2% of Taiwan's world exports, and called the impact manageable.4
Taipei's account: trade as a political lever
On 29 June 2026, the 16th anniversary of the signing, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Taiwan's cabinet body for China policy, issued a statement. It dates the start of the measures to 15 December 2023, when Beijing ruled that Taiwan's import restrictions amounted to a trade barrier. It counts the 146 lines suspended on 21 December 2023 and 31 May 2024.3 5 (The tariff notices themselves are dated 20 December 2023 and 30 May 2024; the MAC dates reflect announcements.)
The council reports that exports of early-harvest goods to China fell to US$13.1 billion in 2025, 13.1% of Taiwan's exports to China, against 26.3% in 2016 and the lowest since the pact took effect.3 5 It also says Taiwan's share of outbound investment going to China fell from 83.8% in 2010 to 3.8% in 2025 and 0.9% in January to May 2026.3
陸方作法明顯是以兩岸經貿措施作為政治籌碼、經濟施壓及貿易武器化工具
Beijing's approach is plainly to use cross-strait trade measures as political bargaining chips, economic pressure and a weaponisation of trade.3
The council concludes that cross-strait economic relations have undergone a "structural change", and says Taipei will continue a "Taiwan first" policy, including incentives for Taiwanese firms to return.3
Beijing's account: Taiwan's government is to blame
On 2 July 2026 the Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson, Zhu Fenglian, answered at a regular press conference. Xinhua reports that she put the responsibility for the ECFA not benefiting more Taiwanese businesses wholly on the governing Democratic Progressive Party.6 She said it refuses to implement the services trade agreement that the ECFA provides for, and that this led mainland authorities to suspend some tariff concessions:
相关责任完全在民进党当局。
The responsibility lies entirely with the Democratic Progressive Party authorities.6
She also cited total cross-strait trade of US$314.33 billion in 2025, up 7.3%, and 8,132 newly established Taiwan-funded firms on the mainland.6 These figures are Beijing's, and the search for this article did not find an independent check of them.
Where the accounts differ
The two sides agree on the facts of the suspensions: the dates, the 12 and 134 lines, and the absence of an end date.1 2 3 They disagree on cause. Beijing says Taiwan's bans on mainland goods broke the agreement; Taipei calls the same measures coercion that follows a political demand. Taipei's figure of a falling early-harvest share and Beijing's figure of rising total trade can both be true, since they measure different things.
The open questions are whether Beijing will carry out the further suspensions it said in January 2024 it was studying, covering agricultural and fishery goods, machinery, car parts and textiles, and whether the services trade agreement is revived.4 No date has been set for either.