Cambodia's trade with Thailand fell 28.5% during January–September 2026 to about US$2 billion, according to customs figures reported by Kampucheathmey. Imports from Thailand dropped 33.9% to about US$1.5 billion, while Cambodian exports to its neighbour fell 6.5% to US$538 million. The unequal changes show that the contraction was concentrated on Cambodia's purchases, rather than an equivalent decline in both directions.1
Commerce Ministry spokesman Penn Sovicheat attributed the disruption to the border dispute and said Cambodia had secured alternative suppliers. Kampucheathmey also reported that imports arriving by sea and air remained subject to normal customs procedures. That distinction matters when interpreting reports of a closed border: the land route and the entire bilateral goods trade are different measures.1
Zero land-border trade is a narrower measure
Thailand's Export-Import Bank highlighted the same geographical constraint in its market update for 2–6 November. Discussing September border trade, it reported no trade across the Cambodian frontier, even as Thai border trade with other neighbours expanded. Its description was.2
เป็นศูนย์
was zero.2
The bank's account concerns border trade for a particular month. It should not be read as saying that all Cambodian purchases of Thai-origin goods ceased throughout the year. Its regional comparison shows why a positive headline for Thailand's combined frontier trade can coexist with a closed Cambodian crossing. The performance of another neighbouring route does not establish that this one has reopened.2
Cambodia had set out its enforcement position earlier. On 13 June, state news agency AKP reported Hun Sen's call to treat goods entering through closed land crossings as illegal. He distinguished those movements from transport by sea and air, where customs authorities would determine whether consignments met the legal requirements. His comments targeted unauthorised entry through the shut frontier.3
The distinction does not give every Thai product unconditional admission at a port. The reported position leaves customs compliance to the authorities. For a trader, evidence of the transport channel and the applicable import requirements remain relevant even when a land crossing cannot be used. A sea shipment should not be classified by assuming that the rules for an illicit land crossing automatically apply to it.3
Diversification began during the earlier disruption
An April United Nations assessment explains the earlier adjustment. Using 2025 data, it found imports from Thailand weakening after the midyear border disruption while Cambodia's overall imports continued growing. It identified switching towards Vietnam, China and maritime routes as ways traders cushioned the supply shock. Those findings describe the earlier period, rather than additional measurements of this autumn's trade.4
The assessment also distinguishes national adjustment from local losses. Perishable exporters faced spoilage and distressed sales, while manufacturers encountered delivery delays and higher transport costs. Alternative suppliers can keep goods available nationally without replacing every farmer's buyer or restoring every border business. Whether the alternative routes become a durable substitute remains separate from the unresolved conditions for normal land-border commerce.4