Technical assistance connected to products outside the EU's dual-use list can require authorisation in Flanders. A European Commission inventory published on 8 May 2026 records the region's additional controls and cites the Flemish decree published in Belgium's official gazette on 26 January 2026. It records authority-triggered controls on unlisted products and a separate suspicion-based requirement for technical assistance.1
The Flemish government adopted the decree on 19 December 2025 after consulting economic, privacy and legal advisory bodies. It presents the measure as an implementing framework for European dual-use controls, intended to protect international security, human rights and humanitarian law. This is a regional licensing regime, rather than a single new Belgian prohibition on supplying technical services abroad.2 4
Support can require its own authorisation
The decree subjects technical assistance to licensing where the provider has grounds to suspect that the relevant dual-use products are intended for uses involving weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes, military end-use in an arms-embargoed country, or components for illegally exported military equipment. It also extends controls to assistance concerning unlisted products when the competent Flemish service has informed the provider about the possible sensitive use.3 5
The decree's Dutch expression for the suspicion threshold is concise:
een gefundeerd vermoeden
Grounds for suspicion.3
The Commission's inventory confirms that this provider-triggered technical-assistance requirement belongs to Flanders. That geographic qualification matters: its tables record national and regional measures separately. An exporter cannot assume that a transaction involving Belgium follows the same administrative route regardless of where the supplier is established.1 4
Software and technology remain within the product test
The Flemish public guidance describes dual-use products as civilian goods, software and technology that can also have military applications or contribute to weapons of mass destruction. Listed exports outside the European Union require authorisation; embargoes can add restrictions. The classification question therefore reaches beyond the physical machine being delivered.4
For shipments, the same guidance says customs can temporarily stop goods while their status is checked. Contact with the strategic-goods control service can establish whether a release document or a licence application is needed. A customs hold is an administrative control step, not itself evidence that the exporter has committed a violation.4
The government's stated objective is effective oversight of exports, transit, transfers and technical assistance together. Its adoption decision connects that oversight with non-proliferation and regional stability, alongside rights protections. The scope explains why a service engagement can warrant review even when the commercial discussion initially centres on equipment.2
The reporting obligation follows the licence
Under the decree, the control service checks applications before advising the minister, who takes the licensing decision. Global authorisations are confined to civilian end-users and civilian uses. Records must be retained for ten years, while holders of global and general authorisations must report annually by 31 January, including when an authorisation was unused. The next reporting cycle will test whether suppliers' records capture the technical assistance accompanying their equipment and technology transactions.3